[Literature] Johann Gottlieb Fichte: The System of Ethics #7/193

PART I

Deduction of the principle of morality1

Preliminary remark concerning this deduction

It is claimed that the human mind finds itself to be absolutely compelled to do certain things entirely

apart from any extrinsic ends, but purely and simply for the sake of doing them, and to refrain from

doing other things, equally independently of any extrinsic ends, purely and simply for the sake of

leaving them undone. Insofar as such a compulsion [ Zunötigung] is supposed to manifest itself

necessarily in human beings just as surely as they are human beings, this constitutes what is called the

moralorethicalnature of human beings as such.

Human cognitioncan relate to this, its moral nature in a twofold manner. On the one hand, a human being may find the above-mentioned inner compulsion through self-observation, as a fact – and then it is

of course assumed that this fact can certainly be found through attentive self-observation. In this case,

one sticks with the sheer fact as such and is satisfied to have found that this is simply how things are,

without asking howand on the basis of whatgroundsthey become what they are. One might even

decide, freely and from one’s own inclination, to attach unconditional faithto this inner compulsion: i.e.,

one might decide actually to thinkthat one’s highest vocation is what is represented to one as such by

this inner compulsion and to actunfailingly in

1 Deduktion des Prinzips der Sittlichkeit. Regarding the translation of Sittlichkeitas “morality” see the editors’ introduction.

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accordance with this faith. [IV, 14] In this manner one obtains ordinarycognition both of one’s overall moral nature and of one’s specific duties, so long as, in the particular circumstances of one’s life, one

carefully pays attention to the dictates of one’s conscience. Such cognition is possible from the

standpointofordinaryconsciousness, and this is sufficient for engendering both a dutiful disposition and dutiful conduct.

On the other hand, one may refuse to remain content with the immediate perception and, in his thinking,

may not stop with the facts, but may demand to know the grounds of what one has perceived. Such a

person is not satisfied with factual cognition but demands genetic cognition; he wants to know not

merely that such a compulsion is present within him, but he also wants to see how it originates.Were he

to obtain the desired cognition, this would be a learnedcognition; and in order to obtain it, he would

have to raise himself above the standpoint of ordinary consciousness. – But how is the problem just

noted to be solved? How does one go about finding the groundsof the moral nature of human beings or

of the ethical principle within them? – Nothing absolutely excludes any question about a higher ground

but this: that we are we; that is, the I-hoodwithin us or our rational nature (although this latter phrase does not convey this point nearly as expressly as the former). Everything else, which is either inus, such as the compulsion noted earlier, or forus, such as the world we assume to exist outside ourselves, is in

us and for us because we are this [i.e., because we possess I-hood or rationality]. This can easily be

demonstrated in a general manner; but the kind of learned or scientific cognition of the grounds of

something in or for us, which is the kind of cognition that concerns us here, involves specific insight into

the manner in which this “something” is connected with and necessarily proceeds from this rationality.

The presentation of these grounds constitutes a derivation or deduction [ Ableitung oder Deduktion],

since by means of such a presentation something is derived from the highest and absolute principle, that

of I-hood, and is shown to follow from the latter necessarily. Thus what we have to provide here is a

deduction of the moral nature of the human being or of the ethical principle therein – [IV, 15]. Rather

than enumerating in detail the advantages of such a deduction, it will here suffice to note that a science

of morality first comes into being thereby – and science, wherever it is possible, is an end in itself.

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With respect to the scientific whole of philosophy, the particular science of ethics to be presented here is

linked, by means of this deduction, with a foundation of the entire Wissenschaftslehre.2 The deduction

commences with propositions of the latter, and in the course of the deduction the particular science

proceeds from the universal one and becomes a particular philosophical science.